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CIA/SAVA /WVIND 700711



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS


Week Ending 11 July 1970

NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.

For the President Only


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SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS





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MARCH - JULY 1970 Weekly data as reported





rose slightly to 78 versus last week's 61.







decreased to 241 from last week's 292. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than figures released to the press by the GVN.







stand at five small special purpose groups, with a combined strength of 54. The total number of infiltrators since 23 October 1969 remains at an estimated 60,500-62,000.






dropped to 562 from last week's 636.





rose to 1,831. While significantly above last week's 1,395 enemy KIA's this week's total is still well below the weekly average of 2,539 for this year. Part of the rise is due to increased activity in the Khe Sanh area.





as measured by the precentage of enemy killed by RVN forces decreased to 58% under last week's 66%.

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Enemy Activity

The level of enemy-initiated activity in South Vietnam dropped slightly during the week, although sharp fighting near Khe Sanh contributed to an increase over the previous week in the number of enemy killed. This fighting involved one of the two newly redeployed regiments of the NVA 304th Division. Both regiments, the 9th and 24B, are now believed to be in South Vietnam. All source reporting continues to reflect enemy intentions to launch a period of intensified operational activity prior to 15 July. Most sources suggest this will take the form of isolated "highpoints"; others indicate (less plausibly) a countrywide coordinated effort. Except for northern I Corps/Military Region (CMR) and southern IV CMR, however, the current limited capability of VC/NVA forces will probably restrict any activity increase to indirect fire attacks. (South Vietnam's Corps areas have been redesignated Corps/Military Regions -- CMR).

In Cambodia, the Communists continue to make their presence felt in widely scattered and (for the most part) light attacks by fire, with Kompong Thom and Kompong Speu being hit by light ground attacks. In western Cambodia, Thai aircraft are reportedly inflicting sizeable losses in strafing Communist positions near Siem Reap City. The Thais are also credited with successfully interdicting enemy traffic on Route 6 from Siem Reap to Kompong Thom. Some 30 miles southwest of Phnom Penh, portions of the town of Kirirom were overrun by the Communists on 11 July. Government reinforcements are enroute from Kompong Speu City. A government battalion is still holding the center of the town with the aid of Cambodian air support. There have been several reports of Communist troop movements in the area southwest of Phnom Penh. Captured documents indicate that the Viet Cong 271st Regiment has formed a new battalion using Cambodian recruits and North Vietnamese cadre. This indicates the Communists are enjoying some success in recruiting Cambodians, and suggests that the Communists are forming the kind of "mixed" North Vietnamese-indigenous force battalions that they have used with some success for several years in Laos.

Enemy Infiltration

With no positive identification of a battalion size group since 11 June, personnel infiltration into South Vietnam continues to be characterized by small, special purpose groups. The five groups detected during the past week had a combined strength of only 54. Since 23 October 1969, the total number of infiltrators remains at an estimated 60,500 - 62,000. (Related information dealing with activities in the infiltration corridor are described in the Other Developments section below.)

South Vietnam Developments

The inability of the non-Communist political parties of South Vietnam to unite in a common objective was again demonstrated this week as the progovernment National Social Democratic Front was unable to put together a ten-man slate for the 30 August senatorial elections prior to the 13 July deadline for filing. Petty bickering and an inability to agree on the allocation of seats resulted in a total impasse. The individual parties will now run their own lists, which will lack the strength of a collective ticket, and leave the viability of the coalition in doubt. Meanwhile, the militant An Quang Buddhists have reportedly reversed their earlier decision and will back an anti-government list headed by Vu Van Mau, who was President Diem's Foreign Minister. Some 20 ten-man slates are expected to compete for the 30 available seats.

The presence of American and other foreign student delegations probably encouraged the 11 July confrontation in Saigon between the police and militant students. Following strong anti-GVN and anti-U.S. speeches by Vietnamese student leaders, the president of the U.S. National Students Association gave an impassioned speech charging the GVN with repression of peace and the fundamental freedoms, and with lacking the support of the Vietnamese people. There is speculation that the American anti-war group may have seen the demonstration as a way of dramatizing their mission and embarrassing the GVN. The intervention of the police to disperse the demonstration was in line with President Thieu's recent warning to the students against illegal acts, a theme which he repeated to the veterans in a 10 July speech.

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Other Developments

A recently intercepted enemy message has indicated the possible presence of a substantial number of previously undetected NVA troops, perhaps as many as 8,000, transiting southern Laos. Our information about these groups is sketchy. The groups in question in the intercepted message were identified by two-digit and not the usual four-digit designators. The direction in which these groups are moving is unclear, hence their destination and missions are difficult to pinpoint. Two possibilities, however, are that (a) the troops are composite battalions, formed from B-3 Front elements, destined either for Cambodia or to protect Laos border base areas, or (b) the troops are part of the NVA 2nd Division and represent the first stages of a possible unit's withdrawal from South Vietnam.

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